Plato

Nominal-ism is a metaphysical view in philosophy according to which, general or abstract terms and predicates exist, while universals or abstract objects which are sometimes thought to correspond to these terms, do not exist.

Thus, there are at least two main versions of nominal-ism. One version denies the existence of universals—things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g. strength, humanity).

The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects—objects that do not exist in space and time.

Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals exist only subsequent to particular things.

However, some versions of nominal-ism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g. numbers), while others are concrete entities—entities that do exist in space and time (e.g. tables, chairs).

Nominal-ism dates back to Plato and is opposed to the views of realism that universals do exist over and above particulars.

The early versions of nominal-ism were that “there is nothing general except names”, hence the prefix “nomin-“. This, however, is a more dated use of the term that is now considered to be a specific version of what is now called “nominal-ism”.